Challenging the Logics of Reformism and Humanism in Juvenile Justice Rhetoric by Cox, Alexandra
 
 
1 
 
Published in Critical Criminology 25 October 2019 
 
Challenging the Logics of Reformism and Humanism in 
Juvenile Justice Rhetoric 
 
Alexandra Cox1 
Abstract 
This article draws on contemporary policy discourse in order to advance claims about the 
intractable figure of the ‘bad’ child in contemporary juvenile justice reforms in the United States.  
The article focuses in particular on the discourses of trauma and ‘brain science’ to point to a 
form of neo-positivism that has arguably emerged and which challenges efforts to engage in 
systematic decarceration.  The article also focuses on the idea of the ‘bad child’ that persists in 
the commitment of some reformers to the necessity of confinement for some children.  The 
article questions the extent to which new forms of positivism challenge our ability to leverage 
structural claims.  
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Introduction: Contemporary Constructions of Young People in Trouble with the Law  
This article reflects on contemporary reform logics and rhetoric about juvenile justice systems in 
the United States (US) and explores the idea of “the child” that emerges from it.  In recent years, 
juvenile justice reformers, who work from a putatively child-centered, progressive and social 
justice-oriented approach to reform in the Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and US, have 
arguably focused their efforts on several core areas: the downsizing of youth custody and the 
diversion of young people into community-based care; the introduction of “trauma-informed” 
practices into youth justice interventions; and the transmission of knowledge about the “teenage 
brain” into sentencing practices and youth justice interventions. Driving these seemingly 
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progressive reforms are a growing group of local and national advocacy and reform organizations 
in Canada, the UK and the US, including system commissioners and lawmakers, who have been 
approaching a new kind of  “penal common sense” (Wacquant 1999) with respect to the 
punishment and rehabilitation of young people charged with crimes—an approach that rejects the 
harsh punishment and demonization of children, views custody as harmful, promotes young 
people’s diversion from the system (and recognizes the labeling effects of system contact), and 
promotes care over control.  Yet, this “common sense” still remains penal in that it is rooted in the 
idea that offending by young people should and can be addressed within the justice system.   
In this article, I attempt to trace the shifting boundaries between normal and so-called 
“deviant” children in the present day, illuminating how these shifts impact on our ideas about who 
is “truly” dangerous and in need of intervention.  More specifically, I argue that there are 
sometimes-competing logics about criminality, growth, potential and trauma that circulate within 
this rhetoric.  There are also broader cultural and socio-structural pressures that animate public and 
policy discussions.  These are arguably the market-driven pressures on liberal advocates and 
organizations to engage in public relations and messaging campaigns in order to advance 
progressive reform.  These campaigns arguably minimize the complexities of young people’s lives 
by promoting messages about the individual lives of children that are palatable and legible to 
everyday citizens accustomed to neoliberal messages about individual effort and responsibility. 
 Liberal-progressive juvenile justice reform movements, led largely by non-state actors, 
have a longstanding history in Europe and the US.  Progressive (often wealthy) reformers in the 
late-nineteenth century promoted the development of a separate legal system for adjudicating the 
offenses of young people and a separate system of reformatories where they could be helped and 
changed (Platt 1969/1977).  Since then, children’s aid societies, children’s rights organizations, 
legal defenders, and various foundations have attempted to reform the juvenile justice system on 
both sides of the Atlantic, with several “peak” decades of reform in the US, in particular, including 
significant due process reforms in the 1960s and a decarceration movement in the 1970s and early 
1980s (Bernard and Kurlychek 2010).  As others have shown, reform movements and movement 
actors are themselves an important site of inquiry. They help us to understand the drivers and 
obstacles to shifts in the penal landscape, but also provide crucial insights into the ways that 
individuals who offend are constructed for the purposes of intervention, enabling us to interrogate 
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more critically what effect reform has had in actually transforming punishment (Goodman et al. 
2017; Gottschalk 2015; Rothman 1980).   
This article focuses on an analysis of the policy rhetoric and public messaging of the largely liberal-
progressive reformers in the US who advocate for ostensibly more child friendly approaches to 
young people in trouble with the law. There is, however, arguably a consensus from across the 
political spectrum in a number of countries, from the US to the UK, on approaches to juvenile 
justice, which are all what I will argue are neo-positivist in their orientation.  Here I use the term 
neo-positivism to express the idea that contemporary approaches to juvenile justice are oriented 
around the idea that we can isolate and discern young people’s criminality in their biological and 
psychological makeup, and act on it through the use of extensive interventions.1  Individual and 
sociological positivism came under question in the 1960s when scholars and activists began to ask 
questions about the power of labeling in law making and law breaking, the determinism inherent 
in searches for the aetiology of offending, and the potentially iatrogenic effects of systemic 
interventions (Muncie, 2009). While it is clear that positivist approaches and orientations have 
never fully disappeared, I argue that the arguments that drive contemporary juvenile justice 
reforms have revived a positivist orientation that was active in the early part of the 20th century, 
but has been reconfigured and reconstituted to fit present day demands. 
The article draws from an analysis of an array of policy advocacy reports, opinion-
editorials, and from personal engagement in the field of juvenile justice reform as both a researcher 
of and as a participant in state and national level sentencing reform processes, including meetings, 
conference calls, conferences, and lobbying efforts (see also Cox 2018). 
 Liberal-progressive juvenile justice reform strategies may play a role in entrenching rather 
than demystifying and subverting the public fear of the so-called “violent child.”  I contend that 
we continue to be transfixed and threatened by the violent child in ways that may actually serve to 
embed violence rather than disrupt it.  I suggest that the interest by reformers with an individual’s 
internal dynamics—from the brain to the physiological processes set into motion through the 
experience of trauma—place hope for change in abstract notions of healing and care that are 
connected to theories about what is appropriate for children (smaller, kinder settings as opposed 
to harsher and scary prisons)—perspectives that are deeply rooted in middle class sensibilities 
about what constitutes change, and in positivist approaches to criminality.  And it is these theories 
 
 
4 
 
that have resulted in a perpetual drive to make systems kinder and softer for children, but which 
could actually make them more repressive and painful.   
 In this article, I assert that liberal American reformers’ contemporary constructions of 
young people in trouble with the law draw from several conflicted and contradictory logics, all of 
which serve to embed, rather than disrupt, ideas about the inherent criminality of the largely young 
people of color who populate America’s juvenile justice systems.  They follow four core and 
potentially competing threads: 1) young people in trouble with the law have experienced 
significant childhood trauma which has led to their offending; 2) young people’s offending is 
affected by their developmental immaturity, measured by their brain development; 3) prison-like 
facilities are criminogenic; and 4) we must close most youth facilities, but there will always be 
some young people who require placement, in small, home-like facilities. As I will explain below, 
these ideas about children in trouble with the law, which have emerged as a commonsense narrative 
in reform contexts, not only sustain and entrench ideas about criminality—particularly the 
criminality of children of color—but draw from and endorse bio-psycho-social perspectives that 
sometimes compete with, and ultimately undermine, claims about the criminalization of 
impoverished children of color by the state.  I will treat each of these claims in turn, drawing from 
these recent discourses of reform. 
 
The Narrative of Trauma 
Although it is arguable that juvenile justice system actors have long constructed young people who 
offend as victims of neglect and abuse, in more recent years, the term “trauma” has been used to 
characterize young people’s experiences prior to their system engagement.  This is consistent with 
a broader emergence of the concept of trauma in the late 20th century—which has become “a major 
signifier of our age” (2009: xi) according to two key genealogists of trauma, Didier Fassin and 
Richard Rechtman. Post-traumatic stress disorder was introduced as a term in the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in 1980 (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 15), and there exists 
in contemporary life an assumption of the “line of imputability and inevitability…. between abuse 
and its consequences” (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 4).   
 Fassin and Rechtman point to the emergence of trauma as part of a humanistic enterprise; 
the experience of trauma links everyone from Holocaust survivors, to Vietnam War veterans, to 
HIV/AIDS patients, to contemporary “juvenile offenders.”  In the literature and rhetoric of 
 
 
5 
 
“trauma,” this shared history of suffering does not distinguish between people of different social 
positions—at least in theory (Fassin and Rechtman 2009: 39).  Yet, as Fassin and Rechtman show, 
there is a moral significance to trauma that cannot be overlooked. They argue that we should study 
trauma because it has shaped the politics of knowledge and intervention. It is thus a uniquely 
contemporary, liberal concept, often used in a colorblind and humanistic way; in one trauma-
informed model of juvenile justice interventions, young people and staff in juvenile justice and 
residential child care settings are recognized for their shared trauma histories (Bloom 2005).  Not 
only does the model recognize that young people have prior traumatic pasts that may impact their 
experiences of residential care, the model also recognizes that staff members themselves may have 
their own experiences with/of trauma that they import into the facilities, and which may affect 
their care of, and responses to, young people.  This humanizing enterprise of “trauma” could 
potentially link almost anyone in any socio-economic position to the young person who has been 
arrested; in other words, “trauma” is a language that is legible across social classes.  Arguably, this 
becomes important to the enterprise of trauma because it is the shared social use and knowledge 
of this term that leads reformers to believe that they can reach key audiences who would not 
ordinarily have much sympathy for young people charged with crimes. 
 
“Trauma” in juvenile justice contexts 
The uses of “trauma” terminology in the juvenile justice context have been relatively recent.  A 
1985 article in Pediatrics charted the epidemiology of trauma among young people in juvenile 
facilities, looking at their exposure to injuries and violence (Woolf and Funk 1985). This focus on 
the harms of incarceration and exposure to violence would later become leveraged in claims about 
the inherent chaos and violence of prison-like facilities for children.  Although there were some 
scholarly articles on the relationship between trauma exposure and juvenile delinquency in the 
1990s (e.g., Burton et al. 1994), the early focus appeared to be on the experiences of posttraumatic 
stress disorder and maltreatment leading to delinquency among specific groups of young people 
in the system (Steiner et al. 1997).  The first appearance of the term “trauma”  in liberature 
produced by US governmental agencies appears to be in a 2001 publication about the experiences 
of girls in Pennsylvania’s juvenile justice system (Griffin 2001).  The discussion of “trauma” in 
the context of juvenile justice received little traction until 2010, when the Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention published a guide for family court judges on what they should know 
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about trauma and delinquency (Buffington et al. 2010).  In keeping with broader discourses of 
girls’ delinquency, which tend to focus on girls’ psychological makeup, as opposed to their 
offending (Chesney-Lind and Shelden 2004; Sharpe 2009), the initial nods to trauma were centered 
largely on girls.   
 By the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century, a common discourse 
had begun to emerge about trauma in juvenile justice settings, reform language and local system 
practices, such that the term “trauma” has become nearly ubiquitous in reform accounts of the 
juvenile justice system. The diagram below (Figure 1) demonstrates the sharp rise in the co-
occurrence of trauma and juvenile justice in Google Books results.  The website, Juvenile Justice 
Information Exchange (http://www.jjie.org), which was launched in 2010 in order to cover 
juvenile justice issues for a policy and practitioner audience, has over 625 results for the word 
“trauma” in its archive.  In a recent systematic review of the literature on trauma-informed 
practices in juvenile justice systems, the authors identified 900 articles published since the year 
2000 which connected “trauma-informed” practices and juvenile delinquency (Branson et al. 
2017). 
 
 
Figure 1.: Google ngram for terms ‘trauma+juvenile justice’, produced by author.  Data source: Google 
Trends. 
 
In some of the juvenile justice reform literature, advocates make direct links between the 
causes of offending and the experience of early childhood trauma.  The liberal progressive 
Justice Policy Institute, a national criminal justice reform organization, argued that “[a]ny 
number of factors can contribute to a person becoming involved in the criminal justice system, 
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including a history of trauma or victimization” (2010: 1). Rise for Youth, a Virginia-based 
juvenile justice advocacy organization, describes the effects of pre-system trauma on children 
who offend: “That trauma can manifest as inability to focus, disinterest, or being on “high alert.” 
This can lead to trouble in school and with law enforcement for young people who are simply 
reacting to past abuse” (2016: 9).   
In a more recent turn in the advocacy literature, the emphasis on pre-system trauma focuses 
on the ways that the system can exacerbate pre-existing trauma.  In a publication advocating for 
the closure of youth facilities, McCarthy and colleagues (2016:5) argue: 
 
The trauma many of these young people have experienced makes them especially sensitive 
to environmental triggers, and yet, many are kept in institutional environments that seem 
designed to trigger trauma and rage: long periods of isolation; harsh, sterile surroundings; 
bright lights; a constant din; and a near-constant threat of violence. 
 
Other advocates point to the research about traumatic experiences that young people bring with 
them into the systems where they are placed.  In a publication that was a joint effort between 
several major advocacy organizations and government bodies, Seigle and colleagues (2014: 47) 
contend: 
 
….research indicates that many youth are likely to have experienced trauma prior to their 
involvement in the juvenile justice system. Trauma can interrupt or redirect cognitive 
development and increase the likelihood of psychological impairment that, if unaddressed, 
will limit youth’s responsivity to services, no matter how well matched to their dynamic 
risk factors. 
 
In a report about girls in the justice system, Watson and Edelman (2012: ii) claim: 
 
The set of challenges that girls often face as they enter the juvenile justice system include 
trauma, violence, neglect, mental and physical problems, family conflict, pregnancy, 
residential and academic instability, and school failure. The juvenile justice system only 
exacerbates these problems by failing to provide girls with services at the time when they 
need them most. 
 
In each of these reports, advocates make a case for the harms of the current system as a traumatic 
force in the lives of already damaged young people.  This claim that the system exerts damage 
resonates with Murakawa’s (2014) arguments about early post-World War II procedural reforms 
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to policing, which suggested that poor and unfair treatment of Black people by the police could 
exacerbate violence and crime, more generally.  Yet, these arguments simply situate criminality 
in the life experiences of the children who have transgressed the law in a neo-positivist approach 
to justice making, reviving somewhat claims about the causal relationship between an individual’s 
exposure to neglect and violence and their offending, while containing them in arguments about 
failing social systems.  This approach obfuscates the role that cultural, social and structural 
processes play in shaping crime and criminalization (see also Bell 2016; Green 2008). 
    
Trauma-based reforms 
One of the reform proposals that has been offered entails situating juvenile facilities “close to 
home” or closer to the families of the children who have violated the law and to provide children 
and their families with Functional Family Therapy or Multisystemic Therapy.  While in one 
respect, young people who transgress the law are being constructed as “victims” at the hands of 
their families, in another respect, their families are constructed as the solution to their problems.  
This reform rhetoric exists at the intersection of responsibilization politics and humanizing 
discourses.  The elevation of the family as the source of hope and healing is a liberal recognition 
of autonomy, cultural respect, and self-determination, but also a perspective that upholds 
longstanding conservative attitudes about the family as the ultimate source of social control and 
societal well-being, as well as resurrects positivist ideas about the causes of criminality.   
 Another solution that is offered to the problems of trauma is the introduction of what is 
termed a “trauma-informed” approach to secure facilities.  Trauma-informed care is described as 
“an approach to organizing services that integrates an understanding of the impact and 
consequences of trauma into all interventions and aspects of organizational functioning” (Branson 
et al. 2017: 636).  New York State, for example, has introduced a “trauma-informed” treatment 
program called the Sanctuary Model into their residential facilities (National Research Council 
2012); other states have done so as well.   
 This solution proposes an ostensibly more humane system—one where the lighting is 
softer, the design less oriented around punishment, and the space aimed at facilitating treatment.  
For example, the Virginia juvenile justice system, supported by the Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
proposed building a new juvenile justice facility that embraced what they called “trauma-centered 
design” principles, including: 
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…. furnishings, lighting, and architectural features, such as:  
• Open interior spaces with views to the outside;  
• Natural lighting, as well as adjustable lighting;  
• Ready access to outdoor spaces from housing and program areas;  
• Light colors; and  
• Sound absorbing materials  
(Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security 2017) 
  
This approach to imprisonment is arguably one that activist James Kilgore (2014) has termed 
“carceral humanism,” which includes attempts by local authorities to try to improve the conditions 
of confinement, but still maintain the commitment to custody and incarceration as a solution for 
the social problems it reflects (see also Gilmore 2015; Schept 2015). 
 
Discourses of Developmental Immaturity 
One of the other prominent discourses of reformers in the contemporary age is focused on the 
idea that young people in the justice system are developmentally immature—that their brains are 
less developed than adults and, as such, that they should thus receive shorter and less punitive 
sanctions than adults.  The brain development discourse is prominent and pervasive, and juvenile 
justice advocates have become well-versed in the discourse of the frontal lobe and its putative 
underdevelopment (Cox 2014; Maroney 2009).   
 The discourse of development arguably lies in tension with the discourse of trauma. In the 
rhetoric about “trauma,” young people charged with crimes have had compromised, as opposed to 
normative development. In contrast, advocates’ assertions regarding young peoples’ brain 
development advances the claim that all teenagers have underdeveloped brains and that deviant 
behavior in the adolescent years, until the early twenties, is normative.  It is arguable that the ideas 
about normative development have a strong rooting in middle-class notions of acceptable behavior, 
suggesting that young people can and should move through “appropriate” stages of development—
from the “storm” of adolescence to compliance with societal norms (Bessant 2008; Burman 2000).  
The developmental discourse suggests that young people who engage in deviance are often doing 
so in a way that is consistent with their transition to adulthood.  Yet, this idea of a transition to 
adulthood involves assumptions about family, home and work in adulthood that are bound strongly 
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to economic and social citizenship, as well as access to social institutions that facilitate 
development (Furlong and Cartmel 2007); it is now well established that impoverished children, 
particularly in highly unequal societies, lack this access.   
 Neuroscience literature has been used to advocate for lesser sentences for teenagers 
charged with crimes but also for more specialized services for young people charged with crimes.  
In a pilot program in Connecticut state prisons, for example, a separate unit has been created for 
young adults, and correctional staff in those units receive training in “brain science” and trauma 
(Chammah 2018). Relying on neuroscientific literature has gained popularity outside the US, and 
is now used by advocates in the UK to advocate for raising the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility, for the special treatment of young adults charged with crimes, and for “child 
centered” youth justice approaches.   
 Yet, the framework of developmental immaturity raises significant and puzzling questions 
about contemporary approaches to serious and violent offending.  For what is suggested through 
the uses of the literature on neuroscience in the advocacy literature, which is that teenagers lack 
“impulse control, judgment, future orientation, and emotional maturity” (McCarthy et al. 2016: 5), 
is not sufficient evidence to combat state mandatory sentencing policies and practices, 
prosecutorial power, and judicial biases that work strongly in favor of sentences of incarceration 
for violent crimes committed by teenagers.  Legal scholar Terry Maroney (2009: 89) has found 
that most efforts to deploy the “brain science” research in the lower courts have failed, in part 
because doctrinal factors prevent the courts from finding that “persons with immature brains are 
incapable of forming the requisite mens rea for serious crimes.” Maroney argues that in the courts, 
the science on the underdeveloped brain will almost likely be subordinated to other considerations, 
such as the harm caused by the young person, in a way that is not consistent with its 
“developmental logic” (2011: 792).  Maroney’s arguments do not necessarily spell a deep cynicism 
about the potential of the science, but rather raise questions about the logic of its use in contexts 
where discussions of dangerousness and harm predominate.    
 A number of advocates point to the Supreme Court’s reliance on “brain science” in three 
key cases in the last fifteen years: in Roper v. Simmons (2005), which held unconstitutional the 
death penalty for children under the age of 18; in Graham v. Florida (2010), which held that 
teenagers under the age of 18 could not be sentenced to life in prison without parole in non-
homicide cases; and in Miller v. Alabama (2012), which held unconstitutional mandatory life 
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sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.  The neuroscience 
literature that was presented in amicus curiae briefs was relied on heavily by the majority of the 
members of the Court in their decisions in these cases (Maroney 2011).  Yet, it was in the dissent 
in Graham v. Florida, where Associate Justice Clarence Thomas’s relied on studies by 
criminologist Terrie Moffitt (1993)—specifically, her work on “adolescent limited” and “life 
course persistent” offending—to put forth the argument that crimes committed by teenagers are 
not those committed by the “average teenager” (Maroney 2011).  Moffitt had developed a 
taxonomy of youth offending based on her analysis of large-scale data sets, suggesting that there 
are some teenagers who engage in offending across the life course; Thomas drew on these findings 
to suggest that the decision by the Court to extend mercy to teenagers was misguided, and that 
some teenagers—those who are the most violent—are undeserving of such mercy. 
 
“Brain science” as an advocacy strategy 
The interest in “brain science” in juvenile justice has coincided with the rise of corporate-style 
public relations strategies in non-profit organizations; most, if not all, of the major criminal justice 
and juvenile justice reform organizations, at least in the US, have communications departments, 
write press releases, and develop “messaging” around key issues, which includes media trainings 
for advocates.  It is arguable that they have had to do so in response to an increasingly competitive 
market for attention in state and federal legislatures, as lobbying and advertising budgets have 
risen, and the law and order agenda advanced by conservative politicians has continued to receive 
strong public purchase since the 1990s (Garland 2001).   The US-based Frameworks Institute, for 
example, aims to enhance the communications work of non-profits by providing trainings and 
support regarding non-profits’ messaging about social issues; they have a “message memo” on 
talking about juvenile justice reform, which encourages advocates to focus on brain development 
when they talk about reforms: 
 
This is a critical chapter in the new narrative on juvenile justice reform. Unless and until 
people can see the systems that are at work, they cannot overcome their fixation on 
individual-level choices and solutions. But this dominant explanation can be dislodged; 
people also possess an incipient understanding that that childhood is a formative period, 
and that context matters. To build on these recessive beliefs, communicators need to offer 
help from careful framing and explaining of two sets of mechanisms at work: that of the 
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developing adolescent brain, and that of the dysfunctional and inequitable juvenile justice 
system. (Bales et al. 2015: 13) 
 
The Frameworks Institute claims that their approach combats assumptions about crime as an 
“individual-level” issue—an implicit critique of conservative rational-choice models. One of their 
positions, however—on the “developing adolescent brain”—advances the neo-positivist approach 
of situating the causes of crime in the individual while linking the argument to a critique of the 
system.  By essentially neutralizing claims about the morally corrupt “superpredators” of the past 
with an argument about the sameness of adolescent difficulties (through an appeal to the 
nightmarish teenage brain), they attempt to nullify previous critiques with an appeal to rationality 
and science (see also Brisman, 2016).  But this very appeal to rationality opens the door for a claim 
about the aberrant teenager—the one whose development is not “normal” and who thus deserves 
harsher punishment.   
The Frameworks Institute suggests that this messaging “works.” Indeed, in the last ten 
years, there has been a proliferation of brain science literature and an unprecedented level of 
reforms, from the abolition of the death penalty and life without parole for teenagers to over 70 
pieces of legislation that have been passed since 2005 to move young people out of adult criminal 
justice systems (Thomas 2017). States across the US have engaged in a large-scale downsizing 
process of their residential juvenile facilities (National Juvenile Justice Network 2018; National 
Juvenile Justice Network and Texas Public Policy Foundation 2013), and a number of states have 
passed laws ending shackling practices and solitary confinement for young people.  The changes 
have been enormous, but two questions remain: Has the discourse of brain development itself been 
the sole driver of that change? What are the sentencing practices and conditions of confinement 
for those who remain in the systems? 
 
The Limited Effects of Brain Science Discourse 
New York State offers an instructive case study.  In 2016, the state legislature passed what was 
described nationally as a measure to “raise the age” of criminal responsibility.  New York is an 
ostensibly “liberal” and progressive Northern state, with a great degree of political significance 
and importance, but one where claims to liberalism can often obscure more punitive practices.  
Before the law passed, teenagers as young as 16 were automatically charged as adults; for certain 
enumerated felonies, 13-15 year olds were also automatically charged as adults.  The law raised 
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the age for all individuals under the age of 18 who were previously charged with misdemeanors in 
the adult courts, effectively transferring their cases to the Family Court.  For young people charged 
with felonies under the age of 18, their cases are now heard in a specialized youth courtroom that 
was previously hearing the cases of 13-15 year olds.  The adult court staill retains jurisdiction over 
the cases of this latter group of young people, in other words.2   For 16 and 17-year olds charged 
with felonies and sentenced to jail and prison, the 2016 law provided that they would now be sent 
to a prison created through the New York State Department of Corrections that would be 
“specialized” for young people (much like those described above, including “trauma-informed” 
care).  Thus, pursuant to the 2016 law, in New York State, 13-18 year olds charged with violent 
felonies still face mandatory imprisonment for certain offenses, even though the law was intended 
to “raise the age” of criminal responsibility.  For example, if a 14-year-old is charged with 
attempted murder, he/she still faces a maximum indeterminate sentence of 3-10 years in prison.  
In short, the New York State legislature enacted a change in the law that, though substantial, still, 
in effect, requires large groups of young people to be charged, prosecuted, and sentenced to lengthy 
terms in custody, conveying the message that youth dangerousness can be dealt with effectively 
only through removal. 
 Many advocates, particularly in the US, increasingly recognize the need to shift the debate 
towards young people charged with crimes of violence (Sered 2017), but advocacy agendas still 
remain focused largely on the low hanging fruit of juvenile justice—the outlier examples, from 
egregiously harsh practices in confinement to draconian punishment for minor crimes—to advance 
change.  This strategy is one that views incremental change—and change in the public 
“conversation”—as an essential precursor for more significant changes.  Yet, it raises substantial 
questions about the core mechanisms for change, as well as for abolitionist futures.  Scholars 
acknowledge the power of prosecutorial discretion in shaping outcomes for individuals in the 
justice system, and prosecutorial practices are incredibly difficult to adjudicate.  As John Pfaff 
(2017) argues, even if minimum sentences are altered through a legislative process, prosecutors 
still possess absolute power in a plea deal to set the sentence. 
 In stark and simple terms, advocates simultaneously suggest that young people’s offending 
has two competing neo-positivist explanations: first, that offending has social roots (caused by 
exposure to adverse experiences) and; second, that offending is normative or normal, and rooted 
in the neurophysiology of the “teenage brain.”  While this is an oversimplification of what are 
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somewhat more complex and nuanced claims, I do so in order to illustrate what may be the 
potential pitfalls of an advocacy strategy that aims to save children from punitive interventions.  If 
that strategy presents two messages about the etiology of offending, then arguably each strategy 
can be deployed for the sake of a political argument in favor of punitiveness or of punitive restraint, 
and neither—indeed, no—strategy speaks effectively to the child at the center of the intervention, 
undermining the possibility of a broader movement for social change and ultimately entrenching 
a binary about youth offending—that there are some kinds of offending that are normative and 
there are some kinds that are so severe that they reflect deep social and personal adversity.  In an 
effort to deliver messages about the etiology of youth offending or to provide an explanation of a 
child’s criminal behavior, whether from a trauma perspective or a “brain science” perspective, 
there is not always an attendant effort by advocates to identify the failures of state agencies and 
institutions (and the adults) to meet a child’s needs that may have contributed to his or her 
offending (see also Muncie 2005).  One such critique has been offered, however—the failure of 
custodial institutions for children to effectively address their offending.  I will describe below some 
of the ways that efforts to close juvenile facilities, if reliant on and committed to ideas about the 
traumatized and violent child offender, may fail in the context of the binary that emerges when 
two competing explanations for offending (the traumatized child and the risk-taking teenager) 
become embedded more deeply in our construction of children who offend. 
 
The Requirement Rationale 
In recent years, there has been a shift by American juvenile justice organizations towards a stance 
that youth “prisons” should be closed.  Revivifying arguments that were presented during the 
1970s (Miller 1991), advocacy organizations and foundations, such as the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, have argued for the end of juvenile prisons.  Often, however, they pointedly avoid the 
use of the term “abolish” and, in almost all of the literature, stress that there are some youth—a 
“small number”—who require custody.  For example, the head of the Annie E. Casey Foundation, 
writing with a prominent juvenile justice advocate, argues that “[t]he call for the closure of youth 
prisons does not mean that there are not some young people for whom secure confinement is the 
right and necessary solution” (McCarthy et al. 2016: 17).  Other prominent youth justice funders 
contend that “[i]nstitutionalizing young people must be the choice of last resort, reserved only for 
those who pose such a serious threat that no other solution would protect public safety” (Peterson 
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2006: 16).  In the contemporary reform language, advocates have started referring to large 
institutions as “youth prisons”—in part to invoke the horrors of adult prisons.  Those same 
advocates offer an alternative:  
We concluded that large, distant and correctional youth prisons should be abolished as a 
construct in the landscape of American juvenile justice, and should be replaced by a 
rigorous continuum of in-home services, supports and opportunities for youth. Moreover, 
we concluded that, when young people need to be deprived of their liberty, it should be 
done in small, rehabilitative programs close to their homes and home communities—and 
for only as long as is needed to meet the ends of justice, public safety, and rehabilitation. 
(Schiraldi 2017) 
 
This builds on the idea that the teenagers at the center of the incapacitation effort must be 
constrained from engaging in crime—a comment on their inherent criminality and dangerousness.  
It also assumes that rehabilitation works—and works best in “small” facilities that resemble a 
“home.”  The current critique of the youth prisons, then, rests on the assumption that large facilities 
are harmful and criminogenic and that more individualized care is conducive to change.  
 There is a powerful assumption at the heart of this new strategy to close large-scale youth 
facilities and build a network of smaller facilities, and it is one that has not necessarily changed 
since the nineteenth century and the establishment of the very reformatory system that advocates 
critique—the idea that removal of children from their families can effectively end or, at least, curb 
juvenile delinquency and offending.  This idea of punishment as “necessary” in solving social 
problems has a long history in the US (Goshe 2017, this issue).  The size of the facility, its 
architecture and scale, and its appearance have long mattered in debates about the content of care, 
even though the parallel world of architectural design has long rejected notions of architectural 
determinism, while still recognizing that design matters.  Similarly, in the sociological landscape, 
the idea that an environment can “cause” criminality has been discarded in favor of more complex 
theories of collective efficacy, policing practices, and resource provision (Sampson et al. 1997; 
Sharkey et al.; Takyar 2017).  The argument, then, that if a facility is smaller and the facility staff 
are trained more effectively, then young people’s behaviors will improve, is a tenuous one, at best.  
It is also one that continues to rest on the assumption that there are certain kinds of children who 
can be managed only through coercion and removal, and that their social environments (especially 
their home environments) are the key determinants of their actions.  Yet, when we begin to reveal 
the social construction of this “bad” child, we can begin to unpack our dependence on the use of 
coercion to “treat” that child. 
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Indeed, it is the notion of the danger inside of the child, rather than the danger of the state, 
that seems to have the most profound impact on the majority of social justice-minded advocacy 
literature.  This idea about violent children is one that has grave consequences for their evaluation 
by the courts and justice systems, and can be highly classed, gendered and racialized.  And this 
has historical roots: throughout American history, white children have been associated with ideas 
of innocence, and Black children excluded from it (Bernstein 2011).  Black and brown children’s 
dangerousness has often excluded them from considerations of their youthfulness (Henning 2013).  
And yet, young people may often engage only in a single act of violence for them to be considered 
imprisonable; and that act of violence often excludes them from all other frames of analysis—as 
the criminalized or excluded child, the despairing child, the fearful child, the neglected child, or 
even the child soldier (see also Lopez-Aguado 2018). 
 Advocates almost never address the failing and under-resourced mental health system for 
poor people (Cummings et al. 2017), the impoverished educational and social welfare systems that 
are incentivized to remove and exclude as opposed to include and protect, the child welfare 
removals (of which there were close to 433,000 in foster care in the US in  2016, compared to 
48,000 children in residential juvenile placements), the homelessness (there were 1.3 million 
homeless children in the US in 2014) (Children’s Defense Fund 2017), and public health 
inequalities that disproportionately subject impoverished people to chronic disease and illness.  
These figures point to the question of the persistence of the individual child, and child saving, at 
the heart of these reform initiatives.  The language of the reformers also demonstrates some of the 
tensions inherent in an advocacy strategy that focuses on individual trauma, but that does not 
adequately point to the structural causes of this “trauma,” or target those causes in the strategy.  
For the strategy itself focuses on the individual child, and arguably draws its force and fire from 
the familiar and protectionist narrative of child saving, which constructs children as victims and 
targets of humanitarian intervention, but rarely allows them room for living complex lives in which 
they are participants in their social worlds (Rosen 2007; Scheper-Hughes and Stein 1987). 
 
Conclusion  
Recently, in the context of the large drop in the numbers of young people in custody in the US 
(National Juvenile Justice Network and Texas Public Policy Foundation 2013; Schoenberg and 
Broadus 2018), advocates have begun to think about the challenges of meeting the needs of 
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children who engage in serious and violent offending.  And they have begun to question whether 
the improvement of facilities themselves is the solution.  The US national organization, Youth 
First, which is oriented towards closing youth prisons, has worked actively towards the closure of 
facilities, as well as the reinvestment of cost savings into community based programs.  Rise for 
Youth, the Virginia-based advocacy organization, mentioned earlier in this article, actively 
opposed the building of the more “child friendly” youth prisons and argued strongly for more 
youth services in affected communities.  Equal Justice USA, a national organized aimed at 
promoting responses to violence, has been engaged in a training in Newark, New Jersey—one 
aimed at educating police about the experience of trauma people have at the hands of the police 
themselves, at recognizing that trauma can be systemic, and at explaining how violence is 
structural.  These are some of the examples resistance to the narratives that I have described earlier 
in this article. 
 The question remains, however, to what extent the existing rhetoric—and in particular, the 
ideas about trauma and development, which have achieved such purchase in the life of 
contemporary reforms—actually forecloses structural claims and in fact entrenches longstanding 
positivist approaches toward the child who harms.  For the child who harms, he or she is already 
mired in the web of cultural, historical, legal, social and systematic structures that have played a 
role in shaping and framing their actions.  Yet, the reality is also that the child who harms is often 
one who has been harmed, which is also often invariably true for the adults who harm.  The power 
of the reformers has been to advance an idea of deviance that has implications for the reproduction 
of the harms that the group of “bad” kids faces. 
 In this article, I have argued that the approach to reform in juvenile justice today is overly 
incrementalist and relies upon three strands of rhetoric—about trauma, brain development, and 
“friendly” custodial care for serious and violent offending—that ultimately redraw the boundaries 
between normal and deviant.  The rhetoric is problematic insofar as it simultaneously stresses the 
normalcy of young people’s offending while it also elevates the exceptional nature of particular 
kinds of offending—arguing both for the end of custody as a standard of care but also elevating 
custody as the only adequate response for the “care” of particular kinds of youth (those who engage 
in violence). The contradictions are troubling in that they will arguably result in rhetorical cul de 
sacs which can be exploited by the very powerful forces of punitive social control which almost 
always seek out the undeserving and the dangerous, and find every opportunity to carve out space 
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for them to be contained, confined, and punished.  In fact, the contemporary juvenile justice reform 
rhetoric derives its strength in the very appeals to reason, science, and “evidence” that have for so 
long been marshalled in support of processes that justify, as oppose to dismantle, systems of social 
control (see, e.g., Muhammad 2010).  In this sense, the reform rhetoric is neo-positivist in that it 
relies upon the old tools of positivism, which arguably entrench positions about criminality in the 
individual, to advance new, ostensibly “liberal” claims, aimed at lessening the burden of 
punishment on those individuals. The reforms that are promoted are generally what Gottschalk has 
termed “micro-interventions” at the local and community level, which are aimed at changing 
individual behavior (2015: 18), or they are ‘child friendly’ practices intended to make punishment 
less harsh for children; these are a far cry from the types of economic and social policies that would 
systematically address the conditions in which children become criminalized in the first place (see 
also Goshe 2015).  Instead, following Carlen (1989), I would offer that we should develop an 
approach to children in trouble with the law which demands that the state respond to the individuals 
under its care as socially situated actors whose relationship (and that of their parents’) to a broad 
range of state and social institutions—from child welfare, to education, to housing, to labor, to 
policing, to public health and mental health care, to urban planning—has deeply and profoundly 
shaped their lives.  In arguing for change, I would begin with the goal of eliminating the social 
disgust that is aimed at the most hated among us—the people deemed to be the least reformable—
the child who sexually offends, the gang member who murders, the chronic and violent child 
“offender”—and envision a strategy that does not rely upon custody as a mechanism to effect 
change.  The temptations and seductions of the neo-positivist approaches to understanding sexual 
violence, gun violence, gang formations, and serious violence are understandably difficult to resist; 
they are the approaches that are culturally legible and socially acceptable, and ostensibly seek to 
change systems for the better.  Yet, these temptations have led us not to dismantle the systems we 
rely on, but simply to reconfigure them.  The idea of the dangerous child may have shifted, but the 
dangerous state remains relatively unscathed. 
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